CONTENTS
 

SCIENCE FOR THE PEOPLE !

proposition that is not questioned by someone, or a piece of

   It is often said that over 90% of all the scientists who ever lived are alive today. Whatever the exact figure it is undoubtedly true that science is the essential guiding force for all technological and industrial, and therefore social, development, and its influence is increasing exponentially. Yet, in recent years, as the blessing of science is put to social use it is increasingly transformed into a curse.

   Science has given us carbon fuels, but now emissions from the burning of such fuel are poisoning the planet. Science has given us electronic means of locating fish in the sea, and the result has been over fishing and the near destruction of stocks. Science gave us the chemical basis for large scale agriculture, and the result was the dust bowl. Science gave us the nuclear nightmare and is threatening to give us another with genetic engineering.

   None of this is the fault of science. At every moment in history scientific work has been constrained within the social relations of its time, and today that means that all science is subordinated to the pursuit of profit. Under these conditions science has ceased to be a creative means of progress and has instead become a deadly threat to the environment and to society. The survival of life on this planet depends upon the resolution of this contradiction, and this is a task which requires a philosophical approach rather than one limited to science in the narrower sense. What is the philosophical method which guides the totality of scientific work? How is it at fault, and how can it be corrected?

   It is well established that philosophy is divided into two opposing sides, the materialist, which holds that matter exists independently of man, and that consciousness is a reflection of it, and the idealist, which holds to the opposite view, that thought is primary to matter, the latter being a creation of the former. For historical reasons it is the idealist view which dominates and determines the whole of human endeavour including much of science, and certainly its social application. Since science is subordinated to the pursuit of profit then it is precisely the profit makers who decide what scientific work shall be undertaken in most instances, the big banks, multinational corporations, and the governments which serve them. Put simply and crudely, in the main that which promises a handsome profit gets a budget, and that which does not, no matter how socially desirable it may be, is denied funding.

   None of this is to say that all scientists are idealists, far from it. It is self evident that scientists behave in a materialist way, that is, they begin by treating the world as if it exists outside and independently of them, but while they think science they do not necessarily think in a scientific way when they come to think about what and how they think. One reason for this is that unscientific idealist methodology dominates the educational and scientific institutions, hence in drawing conclusions from scientific work of all kinds the question of the materialist as against the idealist interpretation has been posed with every new development.

   The era of classical science, which tended to see the world and the forms or objects it contained as fixed and immutable, and related in a mechanical way, culminated in Newtonian physics with the publication of the Principia in 1687. At about the same time, in 1686, Leibniz published his work on the infinitesimal calculus, the mathematical method which deals with variable quantities, under the title Calculus Summatorius. Newton followed with similar work in 1711 and again in 1736, and it is no exaggeration to say that without this method the industrial revolution would not have been possible. In the following years scientists and philosophers began to see the world and the objects it contained as processes in constant motion and change rather than as fixed and immutable. From Kant’s antinomies came Hegel’s dialectic containing contradiction and the law of negation, and Darwin set Linnaeus’ fixed conception of the natural world in motion with the theory of evolution. However the old fixed conception of the world based on formal Kantian logic did not just go away and in spite of these challenges it remained dominant. Suffice it to say that at the end of the eighteenth century Laplace was able to assert that it was theoretically possible to predict the future totally and with complete certainty on the basis of Newtonian physics.

   With the discovery of the electron in 1897 the study of the atom began in earnest, and with this science entered a new age which ultimately placed the relation between philosophy and science on a higher level. The era of classical science had for its objects of study and experiment things which were directly perceivable by the senses, flora and fauna, chemicals, bodies in space. The post-classical or modern era dealt with objects that could only be perceived by use of sophisticated technology. The thing itself could never be seen, all that could be seen was the effect the object of experiment had on the sensing and measuring equipment. Further, it was understood that the equipment had its own effect on the object of experiment, hence the object could not be seen in its natural state. Since the quality and degree of such effects could not be known for certain, much was in doubt, and it is upon just such doubt that idealism thrives.

   By the end of the eighteenth century physical science was throwing out challenges to the old formal, mechanical way of thinking with monotonous regularity. The discovery of radium undermined the principle of the conservation of energy as it was then understood. Likewise, the current theory concerning the conservation of mass was refuted by experiments which indicated that the electron had no mass and was nothing but a negative electrical charge. With both sides of the equation, mass and energy, in doubt it seemed to some that matter did not exist and that the objective world was a creation of thought. This question, the question of the existence or not of real physical matter independently of human consciousness, and of the cause and effect relation which unites them, clearly transcends the limits of science and is a philosophical question. In fact it poses the most important and fundamental of all philosophical questions. Does matter exist independently of man, consciousness being a reflection of it, which is the materialist view, or does matter not exist, being only a creation of thought, which is the idealist view. As we shall see the history of science is the history of this question, which is posed in ever new and varied forms with each new discovery of any consequence.

   In 1905 a discovery of considerable consequence was made, Einstein’s special theory of relativity, which later, in 1926, was developed into the general theory of relativity. Very briefly, this theory taken as a whole demonstrated that space and time are the result of the motion of matter, that they are relative, each determining the other, and that time and space are not the same in all places and at all times. Where two points in space, (two separate quantities of matter), are moving at great speed relative to one another, the rate of the passing of time is different for each point. Along with this the theory demonstrated the relation between matter and energy. Where an object, (quantity of matter), is accelerated to great speed relative to a reference point, its mass is observed to increase, the additional mass being apparently the result of its increased speed, (energy).

   Although this theory could be grasped in terms of the determinate concepts of classical science it conflicted sharply with the idealist conception of space and time. The classical idealist Berkeley believed that position, extension and time existed in thought alone, while others such as Newton thought that space was a void which existed independently of matter and that objects moved within it, and that time existed independently of matter, flowing evenly always in the same direction. The new theory fuelled both idealist and materialist thought. It breathed new life into the theories of Wilhelm Ostwald who in 1902 published a work in which he equated matter with energy, and said that since these two things were only actually one and the same thing then the concept matter could be dispensed with in the interests of what he called "economy of thought". Once again the conjuring trick had been performed and matter was said not to exist.

   Bertrand Russell, who published a book entitled The ABC of Relativity in 1925, took the sceptical view. In it he wrote, "The philosophical consequences of relativity are neither so great nor so startling as is sometimes thought. It throws very little light on the time-honoured controversies such as between realism and idealism . . . there were no conclusive arguments for either side and there are none now." (By "realism" he means materialism.)

   In fact this theory was a powerful confirmation of the materialist view, since it proved once for all that matter in motion is primary to time and space. Einstein certainly adhered to the materialist view. In his book, The Evolution of Physics, under the heading Physics and Reality, he says, "Physical theories try to form a picture of reality and to establish its connection with the wide world of sense perceptions. Thus the only justification for our mental structures is whether and in what way our theories form such a link."

   Philosophy and science collided with a bang in 1908. A group of members of the Bolshevik Party, followers of the noted physicist Ernst Mach, also a member, published a book called Studies in the Philosophy of Marxism. In it they put forward a theory called empirio-criticism, which they claimed was the direct result of recent scientific discoveries, and that it resolved the contradiction between idealism and materialism, rendering the difference between them meaningless. Empirio-criticism was a form of positivism, an outlook which rejects the cognitive role of philosophy and declares that science is the only source of knowledge. Lenin renamed this book Studies Against the Philosophy of Marxism and began a fierce polemic against its authors. In the book he wrote in reply, Materialism and Empirio-criticism, he began by restating the materialist view generally, making himself absolutely clear concerning the philosophical category of matter.

"Matter is a philosophical category denoting the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them."

   Lenin then demonstrated that empirio-criticism is nothing but the ideas of the classical idealist Bishop George Berkley wrapped up in high sounding scientific jargon, and that far from having any scientific support it was thoroughly false. First Lenin quotes from Engels’ book, Dialectics of Nature, written in the previous century.

   "The most telling refutation of this and all other philosophical crotchets is practice, namely, experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and making it serve our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end to the Kantian incomprehensible ‘thing-in-itself’. The chemical substances produced in the bodies of plants and animals remained just such ‘things-in-themselves’ until organic chemistry began to produce them one after another, whereupon the ‘thing-in-itself’ became a ‘thing-for-us’, as, for instance, alizarin, the colouring matter of the madder, which we no longer trouble to grow in the madder roots in the field, but produce much more cheaply and simply from coal tar."

   "What is the kernel of Engels’ objection?" asks Lenin. "Yesterday we did not know that coal tar contains alizarin. Today we have learned that it does. The question is, did coal tar contain alizarin yesterday? Of course it did. To doubt it would be to make a mockery of modern science." He goes on to draw three crucial epistemological conclusions from this:-

   "(1) Things exist independently of our consciousness, independently of our sensations, outside of us, for it is beyond doubt that alizarin existed in coal tar yesterday and it is equally beyond doubt that yesterday we knew nothing of the existence of this alizarin and received no sensations from it."

   (2) There is definitely no difference in principle between the phenomenon and the thing-in itself, and there cannot be any such difference. The only difference is between what is known and what is not yet known. And philosophical inventions of specific boundaries between the one and the other, inventions to the effect that the thing-in itself is "beyond" phenomena (Kant), or that we can and must fence ourselves off by some philosophical partition from the problem of a world which is in one part or another still unknown but which exists outside us (Hume) – all this is the sheerest nonsense, crotchet, fantasy.

   (3) In the theory of knowledge, as in every other sphere of science, we must think dialectically, that is, we must not regard our knowledge as ready made and unalterable, but must determine how knowledge emerges from ignorance, how incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more complete and more exact."

   It is difficult to imagine a more devastating refutation of idealism or a more convincing case for materialism, yet, as we have said, idealism survives in science and remains the determining philosophy for all social applications of scientific discoveries.

The Modern Era

   Physical science was thrown into crisis in 1911 when Rutherford demonstrated the so called "solar system" model of the atom, with its nucleus and orbiting electrons. The trouble was that Rutherford’s experiments and their inevitable conclusions disproved the previous "ether" conception of the atom, and at the same time it appeared from Rutherford’s model that the atom could not exist in a stable condition and that it must give out a continuous pattern of radiation that conflicted with the work of other scientists. The new theory had disproved the old, but at the same time was itself obviously incorrect.  It seemed that the truth was nowhere to be seen. A crack had opened up in scientific knowledge which provided an opportunity for idealist thinkers to confuse matters.

   The next big leap was quantum theory, which has its origins in the study of the radiation of light. First Huygens, (1629 to 1695), developed his wave theory, and later Newton proposed his corpuscular theory. Many years passed before experiments were completed which supported the wave theory which became generally accepted to the exclusion of the corpuscular theory. However, in 1900 Lord Rayleigh, basing his work on wave theory, conducted experiments with black bodies which seemed to blow the wave theory of light out of the water. A black body is a theoretical ideal which perfectly absorbs all the light which falls upon it and re-emits it without loss, and close approximations can be found for experimental purposes. It appeared from Rayleigh’s experiments that all the energy contained in such exchanges must be concentrated in the highest frequencies, leaving nothing for the lower frequencies which were undoubtedly present. This impossible situation became known as the "ultraviolet catastrophe". Within a year Max Plank made the vital discovery which solved the problem and provided the foundation of quantum mechanics. Light does not flow in and out of black bodies in a smooth and continuous fashion, but through a series of interruptions in little packets or quanta of energy, the energy contained in each quantum being proportional to the frequency of radiation. This proportionality has universal significance, and has become known as Plank’s constant.

   Then in the early part of the twentieth century Rutherford demonstrated that rays similar to light, (and therefore light rays), consisted of a fast moving stream of particles. Following the theoretical work of de Broglie in 1924, experimental work proved that particles such as electrons, photons, or even atoms of matter such as hydrogen, behave like waves when accelerated in a stream such as a ray. The ray appears to be a "train" of waves. What was a photon, electron, or an atom, a wave or a particle? Since it was impossible to conceive of a common form of both scientists simply attacked the question from both ends and struggled to relate the two. As the science developed it brought its own new concepts into being to form the basis for practical and theoretical work.

   Since the idea that the moving particle itself was spread out like a wave was rejected the question remained, waves of what? Since the wave could not consist of matter the idea of waves of probability was proposed by Max Born, that is, wave like changes in the probability of particles following one trajectory or another. Whilst this method avoided tackling the wave/particle contradiction head on, it was at least a materialist approach, since it was assumed that the probability of a particular outcome must at least be equal to one, that is, something must happen, which is a round about way of saying that matter does exist.

   An important advance was made by Werner Heisenberg who experimented in atomic spectroscopy. He developed the method of matrix mechanics based on matrix mathematics which involves the use of special numbers that do not obey the usual rules of arithmetic with which we are all familiar. An important conclusion was drawn from work using this method. Not all sub-atomic phenomena could be measured simultaneously. For example, when observing the trajectory of a particle it has not proved possible to measure its position and momentum in the same moment. To this day it has proved physically impossible to measure the position of a moving particle and other parameters such as momentum simultaneously. If its position is determinate in a given moment then its momentum remains indeterminate and vice versa, there always being a margin of error, the product of the respective margins of error being a constant. Since no solution has been found this condition has been incorporated into quantum mechanics and is known as the principle of indeterminacy. Heisenberg first advanced this principle in 1927, but once again he left the door open to idealism and took what is essentially a Machist view, saying,

   "For the first time in history man, on this planet, is discovering that he is alone with himself . . . The conventional division of the world into subject and object, into inner and outer world, into body and soul, is no longer applicable."

   In 1924 de Broglie suggested that if a light wave had particle like properties then particles might be expected to show wave like properties, and shortly afterwards this was proved by experiment. On the basis of Plank’s constant it became possible to relate and quantify many of the properties of waves and particles, such as the momentum of a particle to the frequency of its associated wave. Work in this field became known as wave mechanics. However, theory thus far dealt only with an individual particle and an individual wave moving freely without external influence. In 1926 Schrodinger published his now celebrated equation which takes into account the mutual influence within systems of waves and particles as they act upon each other. The Schrodinger equation underpins the whole of quantum mechanics.

   Experiments can be based on the study of objects in their wave form or particle form but never both simultaneously. To complicate matters each approach yields results that can be interpreted two different ways, so quantum mechanics contains four disciplines each with its own unique theoretical method and result. Clearly it was necessary to unify the whole theory by achieving a synthesis of its four sides, or aspects. Neils Bohr attempted this by developing what he called the concept of complementarity. The best he could do was to express the whole theory in terms of mutually exclusive opposites, Kantian antinomies. Hence it is often said of quantum theory that "if you ask a wave like question you get a wave like answer, and if you ask a particle like question you get a particle like answer".

   By 1930 it had become clear that matter had strange qualities previously unknown to science. According to classical, (Newtonian), physics, a moving body must occupy one place only at each moment in time, and conversely, in one and the same moment it either exists or does not. Quantum mechanics demonstrates by practical experiment that there is a middle condition. Between "here" and "there" there are intermediate states, a mixture of "here" and "there", which cannot be clearly observed by the available experimental methods. Scientists know this as the superposition principle, and connected with it is another principle known as observability. This refers to the fact that, under certain conditions, when the same thing is measured at different moments of time, different results are obtained. Such cardinal contradictions cannot be grasped from the standpoint of formal logic, hence so far quantum mechanics has remained an indeterminate science.

   Dialecticians cannot be satisfied with this. Motion is the mode of existence of matter and that which is indeterminate is becoming determinate. In any case there is definitely an epistemological question to be settled here. As we have said, formal logic understands motion as the presence of a body in a definite place at a given moment and in another place at another, subsequent moment. Lenin criticises this concept of motion in his Philosophical Notes which are contained in Volume 38 of his Collected Works. He says:

   "(1). It describes the result of motion, but not motion itself; (2) it does not show, it does not contain in itself the possibility of motion; (3) it depicts motion as a sum, as a concatenation of states of rest, that is to say, the (dialectical) contradiction is not removed by it, but only concealed, shifted, screened, covered over."

   Lenin goes on to quote from Engels who had dealt with the nature of motion years previously: "What makes the difference is always thought alone, since it keeps apart the moments of an object which in their separation are really united", and Lenin goes on to remark, "We cannot imagine, express, depict movement, without interrupting continuity, without simplifying, coarsening, strangling that which is living. The representation of movement by means of thought always makes coarse, kills, - and not only by means of thought, but also by sense perception, and not only of movement, but every concept."

   Scientists are divided on this question of the indeterminacy of quantum mechanics. Some believe that it is simply a matter of unsatisfactory experimental results, that there are influences at work in the sub-atomic world that have not yet been detected and quantified, and that when they are the theory will be determinated, a view which is consistently materialist. Others take a positivist and sceptical view, as the Machists did, according to which science can never go beyond the phenomena we perceive in thought. All it can do is systematise such phenomena and all that lies beyond them, the real external world of matter, can never be known.

   Various philosophers have interpreted quantum theory from the conflicting standpoints of consistent materialism, scepticism, and downright idealism. Like all sceptics, Bertrand Russell vacillates between idealism and materialism. At first sight Russell seems to take a materialist view of quantum theory:-

   "Space and time were invented, [discovered?], by the Greeks, and served their purpose admirably until the present century. Einstein replaced them with a kind of centaur which he called space-time and this did well enough for a couple of decades, but modern quantum mechanics has made it evident that a more fundamental reconstruction is necessary. The principle of indeterminacy is merely an illustration of this necessity, not of the failure of physical laws to determine the course of nature." (The Scientific Outlook, p.109. Our insertion.)

   However, even this contains an idealistic mistake, since to assert that the laws of nature "determine" the course of nature is to ascribe to them an independent existence, to set them above nature as a controlling influence. It is a shame faced way of saying that God exists. The laws have no such separate existence, they are simply the way matter behaves. They have actual existence only as the forms of the motion of matter and as the conscious reflection of these forms of motion in logical thought. In man, nature itself thinks. If we take this in a one-sided way and consider only the laws that we know, actual scientific theory, then it would be more correct to say that nature determines the laws, not vice versa. This is demonstrated well by the way in which Newton’s theory was negated into that of Einstein when new discoveries were made. In a general sense Russell’s sloppy assertion that Einstein "replaced" previously conceived laws of nature is also wrong. All that Einstein did was to reveal the limits of Newtonian physics, showing that it applied only to bodies moving at low speeds relative to each other and within gravitational fields similar to our own. Newtonian physics has thus been sublated into physical theory as a whole, and within its own limits remains a necessary part of it. Nature itself corrected our thinking, deepened it, enriched it, caused a whole new set of laws to come into being in thought, laws which existed from eternity as the forms of the motion of matter.

   The interpretation of the indeterminacy principle given by the English astro-physicist Arthur Eddington took idealism to what is perhaps its most finished form. He argued that it justified the theological concept of free will. Stating that within the limits of quantum indeterminacy matter is not governed by any law, he concluded that conscious thought controlled the motion of atomic particles in the brain and hence man’s purposive activity, so that thought really did determine the motion of matter. J.E. Turner took a consistently materialist view:-

   "The use to which the principle of indeterminacy has been put is largely due to an ambiguity in the word ‘determined’ . . . Every argument that, since some change cannot be determined in the sense of ‘ascertained’, it is therefore not determined in the absolutely different sense of ‘caused’, is a fallacy of equivocation." (Nature, December 27, 1930.)

   It is on the question of the unity and conflict of the sides and aspects of quantum theory that dialectical logic can be of the greatest value to physical science. In negating the objective world into thought scientists have succeeded in analysing it into four parts, ( the two interpretations each of wave and particle mechanics). This negation must itself be negated by synthesising the four parts into a whole in thought, (theory). For this it is necessary to understand the dialectical relationship between the whole and its parts and of each part to every other part through the whole. Lenin describes such relationships definitively in his Philosophical Notes in the section entitled On the Question of Dialectics.

   "Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal etc. etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc."

   It is important to grasp that the relations or unity between things and phenomena are not fixed but mobile and transitional. Every quality or side of a thing is in transition to every other, and every side relates to every other not directly, but through the whole. It is not a question of how can a thing be a particle and a wave simultaneously, but rather how is a particle transformed into a wave and vice versa? In this respect we may say that, just as there are intermediate states between "here" and "there", a mixture or moment of identity of the two, so we may expect to find an intermediate state or moment of identity between wave and particle.

Conclusion

   In Britain philosophy suffers the position of poor relation among the sciences. It is not even taught in state schools, and it must be. The relation between philosophy and the natural sciences was expressed materialistically by Einstein:-

   " . . . philosophical generalisations must be founded on scientific results. Once formed and widely accepted, however, they very often influence the further development of scientific thought by indicating one of the many possible lines of procedure." (The Evolution of Physics, p.55)

   At the heart of the relationship between the society and science stands philosophy, and philosophy is indicating the need for a scientific approach to society itself loud and clear. Paradoxically, before society as a unified whole, the people, can conquer science it must first submit to it by recognising the authority of proven scientific concepts and data concerning society itself, since it is society that needs changing. The sciences, or at least the scientists, are doing fine. But the practice of subordinating thought and action to objective truth and necessity as revealed through the sciences is nothing but materialism. History shows that those who take the materialist approach are the first to recognise the necessity for revolutionary social transformation and are better equipped to achieve it, and that those who resist such necessity to protect the status quo in their own material interest take refuge in idealism which, being divorced from reality, provides ample nonsense for people to believe in rather than face that reality, as Max Plank suggests. Such is the crisis in science and philosophy today. If we want science for the people, the people must first change society in a scientific way.

Terry Button